The strange death of UK civil defence education in the 1980s by Preston, J
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=thed20
Download by: [University of Essex] Date: 11 January 2018, At: 06:12
History of Education
Journal of the History of Education Society
ISSN: 0046-760X (Print) 1464-5130 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/thed20
The strange death of UK civil defence education in
the 1980s
John Preston
To cite this article: John Preston (2015) The strange death of UK civil defence education in the
1980s, History of Education, 44:2, 225-242, DOI: 10.1080/0046760X.2014.979253
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/0046760X.2014.979253
© 2014 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 17 Dec 2014.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 1458
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The strange death of UK civil defence education in the 1980s
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In the cold war, the United Kingdom government devised a number of public
education campaigns to inform citizens about the precautions that they should
undertake in the event of a nuclear attack. One such campaign, Protect and Sur-
vive, was released to the general public and media in May 1980. The negative
publicity this publication received is considered to be a reason why a successor
publication was never released despite the increased risk of nuclear attack. Using
recently released records from the UK National Archives the paper considers
that, aside from this explanation, interlocking institutional objectives, rather than
simply inertia, provide an explanation for this hiatus.
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Introduction
The history of education policy is mostly concerned with changes to formal educa-
tion systems. Much research has been attentive to schools, higher education, voca-
tional education and (less frequently) lifelong learning. However, nation-states
engage in other types of educative activity outside of the formal sphere. One such
activity is education for emergency and disaster situations that call the survival of
the nation into question.1 Whilst sometimes called public information, or propa-
ganda, such information has an explicit pedagogical function. Indeed, in some coun-
tries such as the United States and Japan these forms of education have been linked
directly to schools. The infamous ‘Duck and Cover’ drill that American schoolchil-
dren undertook in the 1950s is the best remembered and most iconic of these.2 Even
where these activities are not tied to formal education they have an explicitly educa-
tive function drawing on forms of pedagogy and using instructional techniques.
Sandlin et al.3 consider forms of pedagogy that exist in the public sphere for politi-
cal purposes are forms of public pedagogy. This nomenclature ﬁts emergency educa-
tion well as its function is political, as well as educative.
This paper is concerned with a particular period in public education in the United
Kingdom when there was inertia, hiatus and silence by the state on preparing the
*Email: j.j.preston@uel.ac.uk
1Richard Aldrich, ‘Education for Survival’, History of Education 39, no. 1 (2010): 1–14
considers that the needs of education need to be repurposed for global survival. This article
considers education for national survival in a particular historical context.
2Duck and Cover. Directed by Thomas Craven. New York: Archer Productions, 1952.
3Jennifer Sandlin, Jake Burdick and Brian Schultz, eds., Handbook of Public Pedagogy
(London: Routledge, 2009).
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public for emergencies. The 1980s, the ‘hot cold war’, was a time of considerable
geopolitical tension when the possibility of a nuclear war was as high as at any time
since the Cuban missile crisis. The United States and Russia both possessed exten-
sive arsenals of rapid-deployment ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) on a
hair-trigger alert system. A number of real incidents, misunderstandings and acci-
dents brought the superpowers increasingly closer to a nuclear conﬂict. The shooting
down of a Korean airliner in 1983, the perception by the Soviet Union that the US
was preparing for a nuclear attack and numerous ‘false alerts’ meant that the dooms-
day clock (which indicates the probability of a nuclear war) was closer to midnight
than ever before.4 Popular culture was saturated with nuclear anxiety. Films depict-
ing the horrors of nuclear attack such as Threads5 in the United Kingdom and The
Day After6 in the United States gained huge public interest. Resistance to govern-
ment nuclear civil defence was evident through the actions of CND (Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament), local government nuclear-free zones and publications critical
of government policy.7 There was real public anxiety concerning the possibility of a
nuclear attack, and the lack of workable civil defence in preparing for this. In 1985,
the Central Ofﬁce of Information (COI) considered, in drawing together results from
the main polls on civil defence, that around 40% of all adults believed a nuclear war
‘is likely someday’ but most people (around 80%) were pessimistic about their
chances of survival and most thought civil defence would make no or little differ-
ence to their chances.8 Focus groups conducted by the COI also considered that the
public desired an honest approach on behalf of government to civil defence issues
around nuclear war.9
In this tense atmosphere there is a question of why there was a hiatus in mass
disaster education in the United Kingdom between the, almost embarrassed, public
release of Protect and Survive10 and the national issue of a pamphlet for emergency
preparation, unconnected with nuclear war in 2004, Preparing for Emergencies.11
Despite a few minor attempts to revive a form of civil defence in the 1980s there
was, seemingly, no public effort by government to reconsider nuclear civil defence
in a time of both public and popular cultural interest and at a time of real threat.
Why is it, then, that the government kept a very low proﬁle in terms of civil defence
education during the 1980s? A number of theories considering this issue from the
perspective of government arise from the work of Matthew Grant12 and Peter
Hennessy.13 Both Hennessy and Grant consider that the Home Ofﬁce wished to pro-
duce defensible plans for Protect and Survive that were politically expedient. In
4David. E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: Reagan, Gorbachev and the Untold Story of the Cold
War Arms Race (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).
5Threads. Directed by Barry Hines. London: BBC Worldwide DVD, 2005.
6The Day After. Directed by Nicholas Meyer. London: Fremantle DVD, 2002.
7Richard Taylor, ‘The Labour Party and CND: 1957–1984’, in Campaign for Peace: British
Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century, ed. Richard Taylor and Nigel Young
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 100–130.
8COI report from May 17, 1985 on market research (Central Ofﬁce of Information ﬁles,
National Archives, INF6/3490).
9Ibid.
10HMSO, Protect and Survive (London: HMSO, 1980).
11Cabinet Ofﬁce, Preparing for Emergencies (London HMSO, 2004).
12Matthew Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Cold War Britain,
1945–1968 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009).
13Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin, 2003).
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doing so there was a dual purpose for civil defence. On the one hand, the govern-
ment had to produce very detailed, and workable, plans for the continuity of the
British state. For Grant this was the ‘ﬁrst sphere’ of civil defence, as opposed to the
‘second sphere’ for the protection of the general public. The main priority for pro-
ducing advice for the ‘second sphere’ was that it should be politically defensible,
rather than it should necessarily be of practical use.
Conceptually, the pause in the publication of emergency educational advice for
the public in the 1980s could support a ‘punctuated equilibrium’14 model of path
dependence where institutional inertia means that only exogenous shocks are power-
ful enough to bring about change.15 However, this analysis masks the underlying
dynamics and conﬂicts that were occurring at the time within and between govern-
ment departments and civil society. A more useful starting point in understanding
inertia through interlocking institutional aims is through the work of Kathleen
Thelen.16 Thelen, in terms of vocational education, provides a useful theorisation of
educational inertia that is free of some of the deterministic assumptions of other the-
ories of path dependence. She describes some theories of path dependence as being
wholly dependent on a theorisation of strong institutional inertia with exogenous
shocks being the sole cause of change. Thelen considers that, often, institutional
arrangements are so locked in that they are not subject to change even given
exogenous shocks.
In this paper I consider the institutional factors accounting for inertia in UK civil
defence education in the 1980s. The research is based on recently released, and until
now unanalysed, ﬁles in the National Archives, from various UK government depart-
ments, that provide an insight into the ways in which policy and practice was con-
strained by a number of institutional factors. The account is not one that categorises
the civil service as being a naturally conservative and reactionary force. Rather it
shows a civil service where individuals were anxious to make progress on this matter,
albeit for reasons of political expediency, but where the opposing institutional forces
were strong enough to produce a policy vacuum in terms of civil defence education.
It is a good example of the way in which Thelen stresses the ways that power is dis-
tributed between institutional actors, and shows how the coalitional political forces
on which institutional action is founded are subject to change. Moreover, she stresses
changes that can occur due to alterations in coalitional politics. So whilst the period
may seem to be one of hiatus it was actually one in which there were signiﬁcant
underlying shifts in British disaster education, at least in terms of the Home Ofﬁce’s
desire to continue with a policy of public education for nuclear war.
Methodology
The methodology for this paper is based on an archival approach that considers not
micro-actors but the discourses and arguments used by institutions. It takes as the unit
of analysis government departments, local government and non-governmental bodies
(such as CND). The reason for this choice is primarily due to the theoretical model
14Stephen Krasner, ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynam-
ics’, Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (1984): 223–46.
15Matthew Lange, Comparative Historical Methods (London: Sage, 2013).
16Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany,
Britain, the United States and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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considered, being Thelen’s institutional model of path dependence. It is not that
individuals are unimportant but rather that the analysis of individual decisions (within
an institutional context) would allow one to consider a different level of analysis.
There is also a correspondence between the ways in which archives are constructed
that makes it more difﬁcult to ascertain micro political factors such as individual
behaviour. Although archives have been used to analyse the micro-decisions of indi-
viduals, these individuals often speak ‘on behalf’ of their institutions. In addition, the
institution is often personiﬁed and it is not infrequent to ﬁnd statements in the
archives containing remarks such as ‘The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce said…’
or ‘The Ministry of Defence said…’.17 The particular archive consulted, the National
Archive of the United Kingdom, is also organised into government department ﬁles,
which tends to privilege institutional analysis.
The analysis was conducted through locating archives from particular series
appropriate to the research question. These are predominantly the HO ﬁles from the
Home Ofﬁce (particularly those ﬁles beginning HO322), the INF ﬁles from the Cen-
tral Ofﬁce of Information and other HMSO publications such as Protect and Survive
and Domestic Nuclear Shelters. A thematic approach to research was undertaken.
The ﬁrst theme was the future development of Protect and Survive, examining the
ways in which it was developed, altered, resisted, subverted and revised. The second
theme was accommodation to this process. Archival sections were transcribed and
then distributed according to different themes. From this analysis, three themes
emerged explaining this external inertia and these are considered here.
Mapping UK disaster education since 1960: the politics of public information
Before examining the reasons for the civil defence ‘hiatus’ in the 1980s, it is impor-
tant to consider the positioning of Protect and Survive in the wider context of UK
public education for emergencies more generally. In the United Kingdom a number
of public education campaigns were considered to protect the general population in
an emergency involving a devastating nuclear attack and the collapse of the national
infrastructure. These campaigns are not just educational, but also exist as examples
of public pedagogy,18 the explicit use of public education for political purposes. In
each of these campaigns, the emphasis was on documents that would be politically
palatable, and defensible, rather than necessarily of practical use to the public in an
emergency. In some senses, the main function of the public information would have
been to aid social control in a crisis to keep households occupied and indoors, away
from the mobilisation caused by transition to war.
The ﬁrst post-war mass public education campaign called Advising the House-
holder on Protection against Nuclear Attack19 used both cinema/television advertis-
ing and information booklets to propagate its message. The campaign was, aside
from a small number of booklets, not immediately available to the general public
but was to be distributed in times of crisis. The advice was aimed largely at families
and involved a strategy of shelter in place, constructing an inner shelter using
17Home Defence Planning Sub-committee, December 14, 1982 (Home Ofﬁce Papers,
National Archives, HO322/998).
18Sandlin et al., Handbook of Public Pedagogy.
19Home Ofﬁce, Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack (London:
Home Ofﬁce: 1963).
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available materials, and stockpiling food and other resources. Similarly, the second
public education campaign Protect and Survive was largely secret and featured simi-
lar advice to shelter in place and to construct household shelters. The similarity
between the two campaigns is striking, and even stretches to the use of comparable
graphics and phrases in the two booklets. Even though the format of the related
ﬁlms was different (with Advising the Householder using actors and Protect and
Survive animation) the messages and the structure of the ﬁlms, with frequent repeti-
tion, were similar. The advice given in 1963 in the Householders Handbook to stay
indoors is in correspondence with Protect and Survive in 1980 (‘stay at home’, or as
policy makers called it ‘stay put’) and is not unlike the advice of Preparing for
Emergencies in 2004 (‘Go home, stay in, tune in’). However, the campaigns were
not identical. Advising the Householder was slightly more social in its orientation
with reference to a ‘warden’ or ‘street party leader’ whereas Protect and Survive
was almost entirely focused on the household. In addition, the 1963 publication did
allow for a(n) (unlikely) strategy of mass evacuation whereas the 1980 publication
did not. It was only with the end of the cold war in the late 1980s and with the 9/11
terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 that the UK started to produce radically
different forms of emergency education. First, a number of campaigns focused on
speciﬁc areas or groups in the UK at risk (such as those at risk of ﬂooding). Second,
Preparing for Emergencies in 2004, which was in the public domain and identiﬁed a
number of hazards. These later publications retained a political function. Despite its
supposed ‘all hazards’ approach, Preparing for Emergencies had a particular empha-
sis on international terrorism, rather than natural hazards.
After Protect and Survive: producing a ‘defensible’ document
In earlier work20 I considered the pedagogical nature of the government’s public
education campaign Protect and Survive. This was largely a didactic educational
campaign that used ‘surge pedagogy’, last-minute education in the run-up to a nuclear
attack, to inform the public. The campaign used a variety of media modes such as
television, radio, booklets and newspaper inserts. The television campaigns employed
stylised forms of animation to instruct families to construct their own shelter and sur-
vival arrangements. The guidance gave generic instructions on how to construct tools
and techniques for survival. This information advised the citizen/family as not neces-
sarily an ‘active’ learner but attempted to instil ‘action’ into the citizen/family to fol-
low the instructions given. The basis of Protect and Survive was that people should
stay at home, construct a shelter within their house, take heed of warnings and prepare
to remain in shelter for an extended period of time following a nuclear attack.
The development and public reception of Protect and Survive was an uncomfort-
able process for the UK government. This publication was, to some extent, a ‘fan-
tasy document’ that placed responsibility on the householder.21 The nature of the
advice offered (stay at home, and assumptions about property and resource) pro-
duced not only a cynical attitude amongst the public but would also, in practice,
have led to huge inequities in terms of patterns of survival.22 Civil servants were
acutely aware of these equity issues but ultimately the requirement for a document
20John Preston, Disaster Education (London: Springer, 2013).
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
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on civil defence to exist was necessary to justify the government’s policy of
independent nuclear weapons. Political priorities overwhelmed the need to fully cali-
brate Protect and Survive and it was produced largely as a public relations exercise.
Protect and Survive was always considered to be for release in the ﬁnal days before
a nuclear exchange rather than as a public document. The public, media and some
politicians, though, thought that it should be openly available to the public and it
was made available publicly (rather than to those involved in the emergency ser-
vices) in May 1980. The reaction to its publication was primarily negative, with or-
ganisations such as CND using it to discredit the government’s civil defence policy.
Indeed, the views of CND at this time were entirely congruent with the opinions of
the population as a whole. Rather than being seen as a counter-cultural force, CND
articulated the views of a sizeable proportion of the population, at least in terms of
the utility of civil defence. After the discovery of Protect and Survive, CND quickly
produced an oppositional parody called Protest and Survive23 and mainstream public
mockery and criticism of Protect and Survive was widespread following its release.
The BBC ﬁlm Threads,24 which was shown in 1984, showed that much advice pro-
vided to the public in Protect and Survive would have no impact on survival
chances and that those who did not suffer a short and painful death would die in
agony of radiation sickness or trauma, and that the country would, in a number of
generations, descend into medieval barbarism.
Despite this negative reception, the Home Ofﬁce was convinced that it should
create a successor to Protect and Survive, which would deal with the perceived inad-
equacies in the early publication and be politically expedient. Protect and Survive
had failed in its objective of convincing the general public that civil defence was
viable. Alongside the development of a communal shelter policy, the UK govern-
ment considered a ‘rewrite’ of the much lambasted Protect and Survive. This booklet
was to be larger than the original:
Unlike ‘Protect and Survive’, the new booklet will be for peacetime sale only, and its
size increased to 70 pages. For crisis information we will rely on material drawn from
the new booklet, prepared for newspaper copy and for TV and radio broadcast.25
The revised version of Protect and Survive would consist of 19 ‘sequences’ (proba-
bly short public information ﬁlms, or announcements) for TV and radio covering
methods of attack/warning sounds, conventional weapons, chemical weapons,
nuclear attack, planning a survival kit, wartime broadcasting and regional govern-
ment, caring for the sick and injured and disposal of the dead.26
There were key differences between this new version of Protect and Survive and
the previous publication.
First, rather than to ‘stay at home’ the advice was amended to include the
possibility of taking shelter communally. This was in contrast to much of the advice
issued during the cold war when the UK government largely pursued an
individualised policy in terms of population protection whereby individuals would
23E.P. Thompson, Protest and Survive (London: CND and Bertrand Russell Peace Founda-
tion, 1980).
24Threads. Barry Hines, 2005.
25Home Ofﬁce letter of November 12, 1981 on Protect and Survive (Home Ofﬁce Papers,
National Archives, HO322/980).
26Draft of revised version of Protect and Survive, undated (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National
Archives, HO322/980).
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be responsible for their own shelter arrangements. The exception to this was those
individuals who were in the ‘ﬁrst sphere’ of civil defence protection, who, because
of an essential, privileged role in the government, nationalised industry or private
sector, would receive extensive protection by the state.27 In the ‘hot cold war’ of the
1980s there was some debate in UK government as to whether communal shelter
provision for the population should be provided. In a key Home Ofﬁce circular28 it
was proposed that a mapping of UK buildings would take place at local authority
level to consider the PF (protective factor) of UK buildings and structures against
nuclear attack. Only substantive buildings with a PF of 45–65 were considered to be
of the ‘basic standard’ required for survival. Planning for the population involved
the aggregation of individual needs for ‘bare life’ and habitation of up to 14 days
following a nuclear attack (although other methods of attack such as chemical and
conventional weapons were considered) including essentials such as water (2 litres/
person/day minimum) and food stocks (2000 calories/person/day). In this revised
document there is attention paid to communal sheltering:
The circular envisaged that encouragement of local sharing and a ‘good neighbour’
attitude would go some way to assist those who had inadequate protection either at
home or at work.29
In planning for the collapse of infrastructure the communal shelters would have
to provide for their own needs and so plans were expected to cover ‘regimes’ for
eating and sleeping and nuclear and conventional attack, management and control,
appointment of shelter management and staff, information systems within shelters,
morale and discipline, radiation monitoring, sign posting and advice to occupants
on entry and exit. One infrastructure that was particularly considered for commu-
nal shelter was the London Underground.30 It was considered that converting
seven deep shelters already on the tube network could shelter 8000 people at a
cost of £1 million/shelter for protection against nuclear weapons and £800,000
for protection against conventional weapons. In practice, such planning efforts for
communal shelters were logistically impossible given the resources required to
scope them, the viability of suitable locations, and the unwillingness of local
authorities to conduct such exercises.31 In addition, the concentrated targeting of
Soviet missiles to the UK would have made survival impossible in other than the
most remote, hardened, deep shelters. As recently declassiﬁed documents have
shown, in many ways the placement of nuclear missiles in Europe was to ‘draw
ﬁre’ away from United States missile sites by increasing the number of targets in
Europe, which made the possibility of surviving an enormous nuclear strike on
the UK highly unlikely.32
Second, the booklet would follow the simple and graphical approach of Protect
and Survive in a crisis but with some attention paid to more technical language
27Grant, After the Bomb.
28Draft of ES/1981, 1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980).
29Ibid.
30‘Report by the Home Ofﬁce Group on Domestic Shelters on London Deep Tube Shelters
(Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980).
31Letters from local authorities (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/997).
32Eric Schlosser, Command and Control (London: Penguin, 2013).
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where it was necessary to make the argument for civil defence.33 The revised ver-
sion of Protect and Survive would focus not just on nuclear weapons and their
effects (perhaps because mitigating against these was almost impossible) but also
conventional and chemical weapons. It would be 70 pages, for sale in peacetime,
and from which material for newspaper copy and TV and radio broadcast would be
drawn. The aim of the updated Protect and Survive was to ‘ensure that civil defence
arrangements are coherent and defensible’.34 There is some acknowledgement that
Protect and Survive and associated policies, such as the expensive private shelter
construction guidance given in Domestic Nuclear Shelters,35 were inadequate and
that provision should be made for the disabled.36
The Home Ofﬁce circular ES/198137 also considered that many households (at
least 15% of the population) lived in ‘poorly protected accommodation’ where there
would be little chance of surviving a nuclear attack and/or subsequent fallout. This
again is a move away from the Protect and Survive policy, which largely assumed a
reasonable amount of protection could be maintained by a policy of ‘stay at home’.
This raised the issue of allocation of places in communal shelters, which had always
been a thorny problem in civil defence planning. In the Home Ofﬁce circular ES/
1981 there was consideration of the ‘method of allocation for shelter places’. There
was an assumption that in the allocation of places families should have ﬁrst consid-
eration, followed by local workers and ﬁnally those made homeless by the attack.
Here was a clear shift away from the advice in Protect and Survive, moving towards
protecting those members of the public in the most vulnerable accommodation:
Clearly members of the public who are shown by the protective qualities of dwelling
survey to be in accommodation offering the least protection against radiation, together
with those furthest from their homes or places of work, would be in need of the protec-
tion offered. … It is desirable that the ‘allocation’ of places is seen as broadly equita-
ble; the ‘Protect and Survive’ measures are under review, and the revised material may
help in this respect through improved advice.38
It was also considered that the updated version of Protect and Survive could include
sections on ‘voluntary organisations/neighbours/police; civil defence now and in
war; arrangements for the old and disabled’.39 This desire to include advice for cer-
tain groups (older people and the disabled) as well as voluntary organisations and
neighbours shows a desire both for equity and for altruism outside of the family
unit. There is also guidance for people requiring ‘special foods’, such as nursing
mothers and diabetics. The consideration that volunteers should be able to cater for
33Letter from the Home Ofﬁce to the Department of the Environment, November 12, 1981
(Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980). Letter from the Scottish Home and
Health Department to the Home Ofﬁce (Working Group on Shelters) (Home Ofﬁce Papers,
National Archives, HO322/980).
34Letter sent by the Home Ofﬁce on November 12, 1981 to the Department of the Environ-
ment (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980).
35HMSO, Domestic Nuclear Shelters (Government pamphlet) (London: Home Ofﬁce, 1981).
36Letter from South Oxfordshire District Council to the Secretary of State, December 19,
1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980).
37Draft of ES/1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980).
38Paragraph 4.3.1 of the draft guidance in ES/1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives,
HO322/980).
39Comments of Major Smeeth, minutes of meeting held at Queen Anne’s Gate on October
15, 1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980).
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such groups seems impracticable, particularly as civil defence volunteering was, by
the 1980s, practically non-existent, having suffered a rapid post-war decline.40
Despite this desire for a new and innovative successor to Protect and Survive, in
practice this did not happen. Some of the explanation for this can be found in terms
of the difﬁculties of reaching a politically viable document within the Home Ofﬁce
itself and the process was one of compromise and eventual standstill.41 In November
1981 a brieﬁng paper for ministers was prepared, entitled Review of Home Defence
Planning, by the F642 division, which summed up the desire for change:
The pamphlet ‘Protect and Survive’, which was put on sale in May 1980 continues to
draw criticism from some quarters. Its contents are being reviewed to take into account
the threat of conventional war including the possible use of chemical weapons, and
protection against them within the home. The new version, which is expected to be
available by the summer of 1983, will include advice on health matters, injuries and
sickness and describe the symptoms of radiation sickness. It will also emphasise the
need for mutual help and community care arrangements in civil defence planning. A
free pamphlet ‘Civil Defence – why we need it’, published on 10 November 1981, was
prepared to clear up some common misconceptions about civil defence and its value to
the United Kingdom.43
Despite this apparent release date of 1983, as this approached the plans for the suc-
cessor were scaled back to become not a public education campaign but a ‘brieﬁng
pack’ for emergency planners and ministers.44 As will be considered, there were
moves by the Ministry of Defence to delay the production of a new version of Pro-
tect and Survive:
Your suggested publication date of October will fall close to large Autumn demon-
strations by CND and others and talk of ‘planning to ﬁght a nuclear war’ can be
expected. This will hardly have a beneﬁcial effect in the period running up to cruise
missile deployment later this year. I would therefore like to see it come out a little
later.45
Although a brieﬁng pack was produced in time for parliamentary debate on 12
October 1983 and there were plans to produce a more extensive public education
campaign in 1984, in actuality this did not appear. There are references in 1985 to
further plans for a ‘civil defence documentary’46 drawn up by the COI (Central
Ofﬁce of Information) in which Protect and Survive would be an annex to the over-
all publicity. There were also plans to merge civil defence into one brieﬁng docu-
ment, covering all nuclear and civil issues.47 However, the COI was eventually cut
out of the process of producing the new civil defence publicity and in 1986 the con-
tract for civil defence was considered to be one that was to be conducted directly
between an advertising agency and the Home Ofﬁce, with COI removed as a central
40Grant, After the Bomb.
41Hennessy, The Secret State.
42F6 was the department in the Home Ofﬁce responsible for emergency planning.
43Review of Home Defence Planning, brieﬁng paper prepared for ministers, November 1981
(Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/980).
44Plans for ministerial brieﬁng pack (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/1028).
45Letter from the Ministry of Defence to A. Walmsley Esq. of the Home Ofﬁce on September
19, 1983 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/1028).
46Plans for civil defence documentary (Central Ofﬁce of Information Files, National
Archives, INF6/2490).
47The correspondence regarding this matter may be found in ﬁles of the COI of that year
(Central Ofﬁce of Information Files, National Archives, INF6/3490).
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partner. By this stage, other difﬁculties had presented themselves in terms of even
warning the general public about a nuclear attack. For example, the franchising/
privatisation of the Independent Television Networks brought new doubts about
what were already overtly optimistic plans to inform the UK public when to take
shelter.48 What did seem to ﬁnally emerge from this process in 1987 was a rarely
seen, and never generally released, public information ﬁlm Should Disaster Strike,49
which makes barely a mention of nuclear civil defence issues.
As considered above, the Home Ofﬁce found it extremely difﬁcult to produce a
new version of Protect and Survive, which would essentially be a political measure
but which supposedly had some basis in pragmatic planning. The measures pro-
posed, communal shelters, volunteering and an ‘all hazards’ approach to defence,
were unworkable. However, outside of internal difﬁculties there are three main fac-
tors that explain this impasse. First, resistance to civil defence led by the actions of
CND and local councils. Second, the countervailing perspectives of other govern-
ment departments, particularly the Ministry of Defence. Third, government was
coming to terms with the fact that population response to nuclear war would be
more complex than the psychoanalytic models of previous decades had assumed,
adding to the complexity of pre- and post-war planning. I will now consider each of
these countervailing forces in turn.
Public pedagogies of resistance
Public pedagogies, the alternative cultural education, presented beyond govern-
ment,50 proved to be a more effective way of engaging public interest and debate
than civil defence education. Moreover, and as is becoming clear as documents are
being released in the National Archives, these alternatives to the government line on
civil defence were not just oppositional to government policy but were being used
as sounding boards by government itself to rewrite and reformulate civil defence
policy in the 1980s. The government wanted to ﬁnd out what CND thought about
civil defence in order to craft future strategies, particularly as there was signiﬁcant
public agreement with some aspects of the CND position. Government were not just
opposed to the messages portrayed in the BBC ﬁlm Threads (which showed a grim
and nihilistic vision of nuclear war and a view of Protect and Survive as less than
useless) but wished to reinvent Threads to portray a positive view of civil defence.
Government, or at least civil servants in the F6 division dealing with emergency
planning in the Home Ofﬁce, were accommodative, rather than simply resistant, to
public opposition. Hence CND and other bodies did not (directly) ‘stop’ the Home
Ofﬁce from producing alternatives but rather paused and re-shaped this process.
What had been seen as counter-cultural opposition by CND was now part of the
mainstream, and this had changed the centrality of Protect and Survive for policy:
The major presentational difﬁculty that arose in the past with Protect and Survive –
which was not initially intended for distribution before an emergency occurred – was
that it was (deliberately) taken out of context. At the extreme, opponents with some
48Correspondence between the Home Ofﬁce and the Independent Broadcasting Authority
(Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO393/60).
49Should Disaster Strike: Civil Protection in Action. Documentary short, London: John Gau
Productions, 1987.
50Sandlin et al., Handbook of Public Pedagogy.
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success derided advice to paint windows and crawl under a mattress as the Govern-
ment’s total response to the threat of a nuclear attack. (Doubtless they will continue to
try: but it will be less easy, if, as a present intended, ‘Protect and Survive’ advice is
presented as an annex to the overall civil defence strategy).51
This meant redesigning policy so that Protect and Survive would remain as an
adjunct to an ‘all hazards’ approach to emergency planning, which would also cover
conventional disasters. However, despite this lower status for Protect and Survive
there was still a belief that a similar campaign was necessary as the same document
states:
54. Nuclear war emergency information will also be revised during 1986/87, involving
the production of 15–20 short public information ﬁlms for transmission on television,
and linked press advertisements, both held for use in a war crisis situation.52
In order to achieve the Home Ofﬁce’s vision to change civil defence F6 division
had previously sent a brief to a number of advertising agencies who ‘pitched’ in
1986 to the Home Ofﬁce, competing for a promotional budget for civil defence of
£300,000. The brieﬁng pack included not only Home Ofﬁce materials such as
Protect and Survive, but also materials from CND and local authority opponents of
civil defence. In making a decision on which advertising agencies to appoint,
realism in the face of public and counter-cultural opposition to civil defence was
paramount. In stating reasons why the winning advertising agency (Waldron, Allen,
Henry and Thompson Ltd) were chosen, the score sheet prepared by the Home
Ofﬁce considered that:
Ofﬁcials felt that Waldron had thought more deeply about the problems than either of
their competitors…. They showed a healthy realism about the problems of public apa-
thy/fatalism and attack from government critics and were slightly more guarded about
the all hazards approach than the others.53
Hence this particular agency was chosen for two reasons that were amenable to the
Home Ofﬁce. First, they shared the Home Ofﬁce’s pessimistic assessment of the
ways in which the public mood had been shaped by counter-cultural assessments of
civil defence. Second, they were receptive to a continuation of nuclear civil defence
of a similar nature to Protect and Survive.
Waldron, Allen, Henry and Thompson planned a re-launch of civil defence54 that
would involve literature and other print material, a documentary ﬁlm, media adver-
tising and a corporate identity. This was a multi-hazard approach, but still kept the
51Document produced by the Home Ofﬁce Public Relations Branch entitled ‘Civil defence
information and publicity programme: brief for the advisory committee on advertising, COI
and competing advertising agencies’, January 13, 1986: 17. (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National
Archives, HO322/1024),
52Ibid.: 20.
53Agency presentations to the F6 division (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/
1024).
54Strategy recommendation for civil defence, May 1, 1986 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National
Archives, HO322/1024).
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emphasis on nuclear war whilst allowing for other attack possibilities such as
chemical attack.55 In designing their new strategy the objections of critics to civil
defence were at the forefront. A number of letters had been received by the Home
Ofﬁce from local authorities concerning the planning assumptions underlying the
new Civil Defence Regulations, which are detailed in government circulars ES1/
1981 and ES2/1981. These include letters from Ogwr Borough Council (on behalf
of a request from Mid Glamorgan CND), the Chief Executive from the Royal
Borough of Hounslow, Greater Manchester Council, the Greater London Council,
London Borough of Hackney, Northern Ireland Ofﬁce, West Lothian District
Council and the London Borough of Hillingdon.56 In terms of this response by local
authorities Waldron considered that:
Response by local authorities to these regulations (for civil defence) has been mixed,
ranging from enthusiastic implementation, through grudging acceptance, to outright
refusal … [we need to] … create a public awareness of the need for an effective
programme of Civil Defence. In so doing it will be possible to engender a climate of
opinion which will encourage or make it easier for local authorities to implement the
new statutory regulations.57
CND were also visited as part of the Waldron research (but the agency did not
declare that it was undertaking research as part of the Home Ofﬁce). The report
claims that CND had the perspective that civil defence comprised:
A network of Regional Emergency Committees to carry out the following
measures:
- controlling movement on main roads from the cities, preventing civilian evacu-
ation and keeping things clear for the military and police;
- cutting off the phones, isolating friends and relatives;
- arresting and threatening people who oppose the moves towards war;
- taking over the stocks of food, petrol and drugs;
- moving Government Ministers, ofﬁcials and military commanders to protected
bunkers.58
Although local authority ‘nuclear free zones’ and CND had shaped what the
Home Ofﬁce and their commissioned advertising agency felt was possible in terms
of civil defence, popular representations of nuclear war and civil defence had also
altered their policy. In response to the ﬁlm Threads the Home Ofﬁce considered that
it should make its own ﬁlm to counter the hellish depiction of nuclear survival,
perhaps an upbeat version of Threads:
A preference was expressed to have a ﬁlm available which would show surviving
pockets of communities, with perhaps a small proportion suffering from radiation
sickness, where there was much more scope for the services of well trained Local
55This topic is not explored here, but papers in the ﬁle HO322/966 consider as early as 1981
that citizens should be given advice against chemical attack. NATO anticipated that a chemi-
cal attack by the Warsaw Pact would initiate nuclear weapons protocols and would be the
endgame of a tactical war in Europe.
56Letters from local authorities (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/997).
57Strategy for civil defence: 5 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/997).
58Strategy recommendation for civil defence: 31–32 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives,
HO322/997).
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Authorities, emergency services, and voluntary organisations to play a constructive part
in the recovery purposes.59
This was also the view of some local authorities:
The wartime post holders in one of the West Sussex districts have recently been shown
the ﬁlm Threads as part of their brieﬁng and commented after the showing that they
thought there should be a similar ﬁlm but based on a surviving area to show the need
for local authority action.60
This had an impact upon the chosen strategy and in the report from Waldron, Allen,
Henry and Thompson they considered that:
The reactions to the nuclear issue were clearly deep-rooted and based on emotional
rather than rational response. Concepts like ‘The Nuclear Winter’ or ‘The 4 Minute
Warning’ are wieldy known and feared but little understood thanks to ﬁlms like
‘Threads’ or ‘The Day After’ (which had audiences of 7.5M and 10M respectively).
These fears are the ‘bogeymen’ of the nuclear generation. Any campaign of informa-
tion which seeks to break down these fears by rational debate will have an uphill
struggle.61
The view was also shared between the Home Ofﬁce and other government
departments such as the COI. In a preliminary Home Ofﬁce paper to COI it was
considered that:
a sizeable majority regards the government’s protective policy as inadequate, but also
believes that there is little point in trying to improve things given that most people will
be killed anyway. It is a view which accords with anecdote and common sense
inference. If this does correctly reﬂect public opinion then it is an opinion nourished
on sustained, skilful and well-organised propaganda by the CND, SANA and anti
nuclear local authorities. But it springs from the Government’s lack of a credible policy
for defending the civilian population against nuclear attack. Anything called ‘civil
defence’ in this context is almost inevitably regarded as a charade.62
In response, the COI considered63 that the target audience was ‘the general public’
segmented into CD (Civil Defence) activists, supporters, neutral middle ground,
anti-CD/nuclear (not activists) and anti-CD/nuclear activists. They also considered
‘local authorities’ divided into ‘those who cooperate and agree’, ‘cooperate but neu-
tral/disagree’ and ‘non-cooperators [sic]’ (‘nuclear free zone LAs’). Hence CND and
the anti-civil defence movement had inﬂuenced even the market segmentation for
the proposed campaign.
As the above texts have indicated, the Home Ofﬁce was still committed to pro-
ducing a civil defence policy against nuclear attack. Rather than choose an advertis-
ing agency that de-emphasised the threat of nuclear war they chose the one that
would continue with the nuclear narrative alongside other forms of civil defence.
Hence the critics of the Home Ofﬁce did not completely displace the development
59Divisional note from F6 division, Home Ofﬁce, January 17, 1985 (Home Ofﬁce Papers,
National Archives, HO322/1024).
60Letter from West Sussex County Council, February 12, 1985 (Home Ofﬁce Papers,
National Archives, HO322/1024).
61Strategy recommendation on civil defence: 12 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives,
HO322/1024).
62Civil defence publicity, July 4, 1985 (Central Ofﬁce of Information ﬁles, National
Archives, INF6/3490).
63COI Aide Memoire/points for discussion (Central Ofﬁce of Information Files, National
Archives, INF6/3490).
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of civil defence from the agenda (however, they may have stalled this sufﬁciently so
as to achieve this objective anyway, at least up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989). What may surprise these critics was that they had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the development of civil defence and that their views were taken seriously in the
design of public education for civil defence in the 1980s. CND materials were uti-
lised in government briefs and CND was explicitly, if surreptitiously, consulted
about its objections. Local government objections were seen as a barrier that could
be overcome rather than an insurmountable blockage to civil defence efforts. The
ﬁlm Threads was used in civil defence training by at least one county council and
was seen by the Home Ofﬁce as a template for improvement in terms of providing a
different message.
Rather than preventing the development of a successor to Protect and Survive,
critics stalled the process whilst the Home Ofﬁce developed a more oblique strategy,
retaining a nuclear emphasis, around civil defence. However, the Home Ofﬁce faced
a more formidable foe than CND or the local councils in the development of a new
Protect and Survive: other government departments, as explained in the next section.
Two tribes: the Home Ofﬁce and other government departments
As discussed, during the 1980s the Home Ofﬁce sought to change civil defence pol-
icy to include the possibility of deep shelter and evacuation as well as the need to
protect the public against multiple attacks and hazards. In educative terms this was
to expand the advice contained within Protect and Survive to include attacks by
chemical and conventional weapons. Evidence of this arises from consideration of
the proposed revisions of the successor to Protect and Survive, but there are early
indications that the Home Ofﬁce wished to increase the scope of risk factors covered
by civil defence.64
However, the Cabinet considered that exposing the public to options such as
evacuation in the event of a nuclear strike would lead to difﬁculties with other areas
of war planning. This can be seen in various meetings of cabinet committees. From
the meeting of the Ofﬁcial Committee on Home Defence in 198365 they considered
that, although self-evacuation would occur, ‘movements of population would seri-
ously impede essential civilian and military tasks in tension and war’. This reﬂects
previous disquiet concerning public information on civil defence. The Ofﬁcial Com-
mittee on Home Defence, the Home Defence Planning Sub-Committee, considered
the need for improved civil defence, but also the implications of this for nuclear
deterrence:
The presentation of civil defence policy would be improved by public perception of a
scheme clearly intended to reduce death and injury. This might result in greater accep-
tance of the need for and merit of peacetime civil defence planning. On the other hand,
there are substantial difﬁculties which should not be underestimated. The next 12
months are likely to be critical for public conﬁdence in the Government’s defence policy.
The announcement of a departure from stayput [sic] and the start of evacuation planning
would so raise the proﬁle of civil defence as to cause increasing public scepticism as
to deterrence and as to the assessment of the low risk of a European war. Detailed
64Letter from J.A. Howard of F6 division to R.F. Cooke Esq. of the UKWMO, of July 15,
1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/996).
65Cabinet document from the Ofﬁcial Committee on Home Defence, Planned Evacuations
Options, January 24, 1983: 4 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/998).
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evacuation planning would mean the disclosure of likely targets, associating them in the
public mind with danger rather than with their contribution to national security. In the
light of experience at Greenham Common, the United States might be concerned about
the further focusing of public attention on their UK installations.66
This desire to stall the decision for public information was further reﬂected in the
minutes of a 1982 sub-committee on evacuation:
in view of the highly sensitive defence climate likely in 1983 Ministers will also wish
to consider deferring their decision on any of the schemes or other courses of action.
This involves taking a calculated risk that the international situation will not deteriorate
sharply during 1983.67
As well as ofﬁcial committees, and the Cabinet, it is clear that government minis-
tries other than the Home Ofﬁce had their own objections, connected to geopolitical
positioning, to an expansion of civil defence education:
THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE said that the political dangers of
announcing work on an evacuation scheme should be underlined in the report to Min-
isters. The next twelve months would be critical for the Government’s nuclear policy
with the arrival in this country of the ﬁrst cruise missiles. The announcement that the
government was considering a policy of evacuation would be particularly damaging to
the credibility of that policy. Ofﬁcials should steer Ministers towards postponing any
overt work on evacuation planning for the next year.68
At the same meeting, the Ministry of Defence also gave its objections:
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE said that, following last week’s leaks in the press,
they had briefed their Ministers on the work being done on evacuation policy. They
would be unhappy about any major shifts in policy over the coming year. Any move
that would associate nuclear deterrence, and particularly American nuclear weapons
based in the United Kingdom, with danger rather than with security in the public mind
would be unwelcome.69
As can be seen by the above evidence, the Home Ofﬁce F6 division faced some crit-
icism from other government departments in terms of civil defence drawing attention
to other critical aspects of military policy and geopolitical stance. This made the task
of revising Protect and Survive more difﬁcult.
Rethinking population response to nuclear war: the ‘difﬁcult’ subject and
pedagogical ﬁt
The third reason why there was little progress in reforming Protect and Survive in
this period is concerned with, if not political pressures, a change in the disciplinary
orientations of mass psychology towards a cognitive and clinical approach to look-
ing at population response. This presented a difﬁcult challenge to policy-makers
who faced a citizenry who would, it was believed, behave rationally in the run-up to
66Ofﬁcial Committee on Home Defence, Home Defence Planning Sub-committee, minutes of
meeting held on December 21, 1982 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/998).
67December 1982 Cabinet ofﬁcial committee on home defence options (Home Ofﬁce Papers,
National Archives, HO322/988).
68Home Defence Planning Sub-committee, December 14, 1982 (Home Ofﬁce Papers,
National Archives, HO322/998).
69Ibid.
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a nuclear attack. This rationality would sit uneasily with ofﬁcial advice as people
undertook behaviours such as ﬂeeing the site of expected nuclear strikes (known in
ofﬁcial jargon as ‘self-evacuation’) and stockpiling food for long periods (‘hoard-
ing’), hence using their rational cognitive processes to make judgements. This was
in contrast to the possible effects of a nuclear attack on post-attack psychology
where clinical psychology emphasised trauma, stress and anxiety disorder on a wide
basis. In short, in considering mass population response to nuclear war there was a
movement from a psychodynamic perspective in the early 1950s and 1960s with a
psychoanalytical model of predicting individual behaviour to a more cognitive and
clinical model of individual group behaviour in the 1970s and 1980s. This made it
difﬁcult for the Home Ofﬁce to reconcile population response with the didactic ped-
agogical advice in Protect and Survive. Rather than a psychodynamic subject who
would look to authority (the government) in times of crisis, subjects became ‘difﬁ-
cult’ to manage. Predicting how the population en masse would respond to a nuclear
attack was obviously complex and the British state commissioned a number of
reports in putting together a picture of this.
The earliest government data on how a population might respond to a nuclear
attack came from the War Ofﬁce.70 In a 1958 report, the effects are considered to be
purely physical with little consideration of behavioural or cognitive response result-
ing from attack other than people affected by ﬂash blindness, who may become a
‘nuisance’. Another document consulted by the War Ofﬁce was a NATO conﬁdential
report.71 In terms of social organisation, the NATO report suggests that in areas of
heavy damage there would be inaction whereas more capable survivors might be in
a ‘state of heightened suggestibility’ with the formation of ‘local leaders’. There
might also be ‘irrational hostility’ towards authority. There would also be ‘the
spreading of rumours’, which may ‘cause panic’. The report uses a psychodynamic
model of mass population response to nuclear attack:
a near miss experience shatters ego-defences, in particular the feeling of personal
invulnerability, and that a remote-miss experience strengthens this feeling … by anal-
ogy with conditioning, fear is reinforced in near-miss experiences and extinguished in
remote-miss experiences.72
This psychodynamic model produced a strong steer to the state to act as a central
voice (in Freudian terms ‘the superego’) in reducing the fear of citizens.
In contrast to this psychodynamic approach, which used case-study data, in the
1970s and 1980s there was a move towards using experimental and clinical studies
to ascertain mass population response. On behalf of the Home Ofﬁce, Sally Leives-
ley, with other authors, was asked to consider the various psychological responses to
the threat and actuality of nuclear attack. In the summary of their paper Population
Response to War, Sally Leivesley and Jane Hogg consider that the UK would not
automatically recover. In their summary they state:
70Nuclear attack and warning systems: a preliminary study of the data available from the
AORG tactical war game on the warning problem (War Ofﬁce ﬁles, National Archives,
WO291/2194).
71Studies of disaster and their value for predicting behaviour under nuclear attack (War Ofﬁce
Files, National Archives, WO291/2309).
72Ibid.
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It is concluded that with a weight of attack of 300 megatons the prospects for social
and economic regeneration are very much in the balance.73
Some of their report is positive regarding the need to educate the population prior to
a nuclear attack. They state that:
As a result of the denial that occurs during the threat period prior to strike certain
groups within the population may not take shelter, provide for an extended period of
survival or heed warnings of radiological and other unseen hazards. Education of the
population in peacetime on the dangers of a nuclear strike and methods of protection
would to some extent overcome this denial.74
They consider that there will be reasonably rational reactions by the population to
nuclear attack: for example, that hoarding would be common as a rational reaction
to preparing for nuclear war75 and that the population would engage in self-recovery
activity.76 The population would also engage in ‘self-evacuation’ as a spontaneous
activity77 but would not panic:
The main recommendation is that the image of panic be dismissed from the minds of
the planners at central government and those ofﬁcers with designated wartime duties in
regional and local governments. Attention is drawn to the fact that there were similar
fears about public behaviour prior to World War II. However, the World War II Bomb-
ing studies suggest that panic, if it existed, was extremely limited.78
However, despite this rationality there would be clinical implications of nuclear war
on a massive scale, resulting in difﬁculties in terms of national recovery:
A condition known as the Disaster Syndrome is suffered by survivors of disasters, and
manifests itself as anxiety or depression in either mild or severe forms … where loss
of life is >70 pc, 90 pc would have disaster syndrome.79
In some ways, these reports supported the direction of travel of the Home Ofﬁce.
For example, Leivesley supported the concept of public education prior to a nuclear
attack, evacuation and even deep shelter, which were proposed as part of the
successor to Protect and Survive. However, the tone of Protect and Survive, and per-
haps even the successor to Protect and Survive, was extremely didactic, which did
not ﬁt easily with the conception of an aware, and rational, subject. Moreover,
Leivesley’s thoughts on the clinical reaction to a nuclear attack were bleak, empha-
sising that the majority of the population would suffer from clinical depression and
other symptoms. This would have made mobilisation of the labour force into
rebuilding and agriculture extremely difﬁcult. Leiversley was prepared to consider
73‘Population response to war’, January 22, 1982, summary (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National
Archives, HO322/1044).
74Ibid.: 1.
75A brief discussion of the implications of hoarding for post-attack recovery. Sally Leiversley,
September 14, 1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/1044).
76An analysis of self-help and informal voluntary activity in Britain post-attack. Sally Lei-
versley, draft no. 5, September 15, 1981 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/
10044).
77‘Population Response to War’, January 22, 1982: 2 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National
Archives, HO322/1044).
78‘Response to Danger: Panic in the Community’, Sally Leiversley, August 28, 1981 (Home
Ofﬁce Papers, National Archives, HO322/1044).
79‘Population Response to War’, January 22, 1982: 5 (Home Ofﬁce Papers, National
Archives, HO322/1044).
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the nightmare scenario that the Home Ofﬁce would not: the collapse of the UK as a
functioning state. Indeed, to mobilise such a depressed and disgruntled population
the Home Ofﬁce, in other documents, was considering draconian options such as
martial law and the reintroduction of the death penalty.80
Conclusion
The lack of progress during this period seems to be compatible with Thelen’s institutional
conception of change. Having made public Protect and Survive in 1980 it became
increasingly difﬁcult to revise or reinvent public education for civil defence in the United
Kingdom. However, this was by no means due to institutional inertia or ‘stickiness’.
Rather, the government department responsible for civil defence in the United Kingdom
(the Home Ofﬁce) was continually attempting to revise civil defence, albeit for political
purposes. Its failure to do so, even in a period of extreme geopolitical tension, was largely
due to the countervailing forces at the time. The public pedagogies of CND were
absorbed within mainstream popular culture, local government was unwilling to cooper-
ate, scientiﬁc advice ran contrary to the proposed information, and the publication of
advice was against the strategic priorities of the Ministry of Defence. This meant that the
‘contested nature of institutional development’81 and its ‘political dynamics’82 were of
the utmost importance. Perhaps CND, and the anti-nuclear lobby, would not have had as
much purchase at the time were it not for the institutional interlocking between their
opposition to public civil defence and that of other departments such as the MOD. In
addition, new models of the rational subject produced a theory of the citizen that was very
different from the passive learner assumed by Protect and Survive.
Path dependence means that, even when there is political will by a department to
change policy, there may be institutional interdependencies that work against
change. As has also been seen, civil society has a central role in delaying, or chang-
ing, the form of disaster education. CND and critics of civil defence had a very
powerful role in delaying and subverting Home Ofﬁce intentions. Interestingly,
CND and fellow travellers worked in the interest of some government departments
that were opposed to the Home Ofﬁce policies, such as the MOD. Institutions with
radically different objectives became ‘locked in’ to a common purpose and ‘Protect
and Survive’ was to disappear from British civil defence policy. Its contemporary
relevance now is only as a bizarre relic of popular culture from the 1980s.83
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